Who Governed Yale? Kingman Brewster and Higher Education in the 1970s by Zelinsky, Nathaniel
Yale University
EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale
MSSA Kaplan Prize for Use of MSSA Collections Library Prizes
5-1-2013
Who Governed Yale? Kingman Brewster and
Higher Education in the 1970s
Nathaniel Zelinsky
Yale University
Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/mssa_collections
Part of the Higher Education Commons, and the United States History Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Library Prizes at EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. It has
been accepted for inclusion in MSSA Kaplan Prize for Use of MSSA Collections by an authorized administrator of EliScholar – A Digital Platform for
Scholarly Publishing at Yale. For more information, please contact elischolar@yale.edu.
Recommended Citation
Zelinsky, Nathaniel, "Who Governed Yale? Kingman Brewster and Higher Education in the 1970s" (2013). MSSA Kaplan Prize for Use
of MSSA Collections. 14.
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/mssa_collections/14
Yale University
EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale
MSSA Kaplan Prize for Yale History Library Prizes
5-2013
Who Governed Yale? Kingman Brewster and
Higher Education in the 1970s
Nathaniel Zelinsky
Yale University
Follow this and additional works at: http://elischolar.library.yale.edu/mssa_yale_history
Part of the Higher Education Commons, and the United States History Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Library Prizes at EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. It has
been accepted for inclusion in MSSA Kaplan Prize for Yale History by an authorized administrator of EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly
Publishing at Yale. For more information, please contact elischolar@yale.edu.
Recommended Citation




Who Governed Yale?  
Kingman Brewster and Higher Education in the 1970s !!!
!
                      Image credit: Newsweek, June 15, 1970, Speeches and Articles by and about Presidents of Yale University (RU 65), Manuscripts 





Senior Essay, Department of History, Yale University 
April 1, 2013 
 
*This paper received the Manuscripts and Archives Diane Kaplan Memorial Senior Essay Prize 
Zelinsky 1!
A light drizzle fell on Thursday, April 23, 1970, as eight hundred protestors chanted  
outside Yale University’s Sprague Hall. Their voices carried into the building, where Yale’s 
faculty gathered for an unprecedented meeting. The question to be decided: Would the university 
shut down, “striking,” to show solidarity with Bobby Seale, the national leader of the Black 
Panthers then on trial for conspiracy to commit murder a few blocks away in New Haven’s court 
house? In the days before and after April 23, twelve thousand demonstrators flocked to the Elm 
City to participate in a rally supporting Seale on “May Day.” The threat of violence loomed over 
the faculty’s proceedings. Some vocal radicals vowed to “free Bobby” and “burn Yale.” The 
more moderate simply demanded that the university strike.1  
 In this moment of tension, Yale president Kingman Brewster addressed the assembled 
faculty. Under no circumstances should the university itself close, though students should be free 
to not attend classes. Nor, according to Brewster, would the institution take an official position 
on the Seale trial. Then, in front of the assembled dons of Yale, he uttered a line that ignited a 
media firestorm — a line so famous the New York Times would highlight it in his obituary.2 
Though the university must remain neutral, Brewster himself was skeptical that a black 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 This essay was originally submitted in the spring of 2013. When I initially placed it online in 2014, I fixed a few 
typos present in that first version. In the fall of 2014, I wrote an article about the Woodward Report for the Yale 
Alumni Magazine’s January/February 2015 issue. In the course of writing that article, I further corrected a few 
errors, which have all been noted with footnotes marked with asterisks instead of numbers. I owe a debt to 
Geoffrey Kabaservice for spotting what might have been the most egregious error: my misspelling of his name, in 
parts, for which I apologize.  
1 On the faculty meeting, see: Michael Sherman, “Academic Requirements Left Up to Individual Discretion,” Yale 
Daily News, April 24, 1970, 1. On the events surrounding May Day in general, see: Paul Bass and Douglas Rae, 
Murder in the Model City (New York: Basic Books, 2006). For a history-cum-memoir written immediately 
following the events, see: John Hersey, Letter to the Alumni (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970). See also, Jon Taft, 
Mayday at Yale: A Case Study in Student Radicalism (Boulder: Westview Press, 1976). Also see, Geoffrey 
Kavaservice, The Guardians: Kingman Brewster, His Circle, and The Rise of The Liberal Establishment (New 
York: Henry and Holt, 2004), 402-457. 
2 Eric Pace, “Kingman Brewster J., 69, Ex-Yale President and U.S. Envoy, Dies,” The New York Times, November 
9, 1988, D29. 
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revolutionary could receive a “fair trial anywhere in the United States.”3 A year later, in an 
interview, professor of classics Donald Kagan classified that speech as “classically Brewster.” 
Yale’s head of state simultaneously appealed to conservative and liberal wings of the faculty — 
the former with his vow to maintain academic functions in the midst of chaos, the latter with his 
condemnation of the American legal system.4  
 As Kagan suggested, occupying opposing ends of the ideological spectrum had become 
commonplace for Brewster throughout his tenure at Yale, which began in 1963. Born to a 
patrician New England family, Kingman Brewster had graduated from Yale College in 1941 and 
soon after joined the Navy at the onset of World War Two. When peace came, he earned his 
LL.B. and entered the world of academia as a Harvard law professor. Tapped as Yale’s provost 
in 1960, he became president three years later, just as Yale and the nation entered the turbulent 
waters of the 1960s — a cultural sea on which raged the storms of student unrest, civil rights, 
and Vietnam. In the coming decade, he would become a national figure, gracing the covers of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 This account of Brewster’s speech relies on an oral history interview with Donald Kagan, conducted in 1971. 
Donald Kagan, interview by Brooke Manville, transcript, April 27, 1971, May Day Rally and Yale Collection (RU 
86), Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library, Accession 1983-A-108, Box 1, Folder 6. The full content 
of Brewster’s speech is a matter of historical debate. Most accounts, including those by Bass, Hersey and 
Kabaservice, only cite the portion of Brewster’s speech regarding the ability of a black man to receive a fair trial in 
the United States. These histories quote an edited statement released by the university to the press on April 24, 
which purported to be the entirety of Brewster’s speech to the faculty and was intended to clarify Brewster’s more 
controversial comments. However, that statement does not include Brewster’s commitment that the university 
remain open — a comment that has, until now, been overlooked. Hersey, for instance, prints the press release as if it 
were Brewster’s complete speech. Hersey, Letter to the Alumni, 87-8. For a copy of that press release, see: Remarks 
of President Kingman Brewster at Yale College Faculty meeting, April 23, 1970, May Day Rally and Yale 
Collection, Accession 1971-A-004, Box 2, Folder “Statements, Releases, etc. by Kingman Brewster.” A single copy 
of Brewster’s full speech survives today in his presidential archives. It differs slightly from Kagan’s account. In that 
version, Brewster ended, instead of began, his speech with a defense of the university remaining opening. However, 
there is no indication that the archived document is the final draft of Brewster’s speech. See: Statement by Kingman 
Brewster, Jr. at meeting of the Faculty of Yale College April 23, 1970, Office of the President, Yale University, 
Records Concerning the May Day Rally (RU 16), Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library, Accession 
1983-A-108, Box 1, Folder 6. When interviewed, Brewster’s aide who helped write the speech, Henry “Sam” 
Chauncey, Jr., vaguely remembered Kagan’s version of events. Henry “Sam” Chauncey, Jr., interview by author, 
electronic recording, February 14, 2013. 
4 Donald Kagan, interview by Brooke Manville, April 27, 1971. After extensive debate, the Yale College faculty did 
vote to “modify“ normal academic expectations. 
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Time and Newsweek, serving on presidential commissions, and symbolizing the face of American 
academia.5 
Yale’s new president governed pragmatically, choosing to champion causes that served 
the political necessities of the moment.6 A lifelong sailor, Brewster once compared academic 
administration to his maritime pastime. 7 In a way, as a president he resembled a captain who 
tacked to the right or to the left as needed in the face of heavy winds. According to one of his 
colleagues, Brewster “was not going to take any unbending positions, ideologically or 
philosophically… He managed Tuesday when Tuesday came, and he managed Wednesday when 
Wednesday came.”8   
Over the course of the 1960s, two issues in particular, the campaign to coeducate Yale 
and the university’s response to student disruption, highlight Brewster’s pragmatic approach to 
governance. Beginning in the mid-1960s, Yale began the process that would culminate with the 
admission of women in 1969. Mindful that some alumni opposed female students on campus and 
that he needed those alumni’s support, Brewster approached a shift in gender policy with 
extreme reluctance. When others pressed for women in the classroom, he first advocated a 
partnership with Vassar, an all-women’s college in upstate New York. When that plan failed, he 
proposed building a separate female-only institution in New Haven, rather than transform the all-
boys-club that was Yale College. And when the possibility of coeducation became increasingly 
realistic, he developed a signature catch phrase to satisfy the more chauvinistic alumni: 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 On Brewster’s life and prominence in American politics, see Geoffrey Kabaservice’s The Guardians, the closest 
work that exists to a biography of Brewster. 
6 In seeing Brewster as a pragmatist, I am influenced by Kabaservice’s The Guardians, and John Thelin, A History 
of American Higher Education (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 313. 
7 R. Thomas Herman, “The Inscrutable King of Yale,” (draft article for Harper’s, never published, August 9, 1968), 
Speeches and Articles by and about Presidents of Yale University (RU 65), Manuscripts and Archives, Yale 
University Library, Accession 1988-A-056, Box 2, Folder 47.  
8 William Kessen, interview with Geoffrey Kabaservice, transcript, June 2, 1992, Griswold-Brewster History 
Project, Yale University (RU 217), Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library, Box 6, Folder 82. 
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Regardless of the acceptance of women, Yale would always produce “one thousand male leaders 
a year.” Faced with pleasing those Yale graduates opposed to coeducation, Brewster tacked to 
the right, vowing to preserve a significant majority of men at Yale.  
 In contrast to his conservatism with regards to women in academia, Brewster often 
acquiesced to the confrontational tactics of the 1960s New Left. When the local black 
community threatened violence if Yale allowed Governor George Wallace, a controversial 
segregationist, to speak on its campus in 1963, Brewster pressured students to disinvite their 
guest. When undergraduates forcibly occupied administrative offices in 1969, officials acceded 
to their demands. These events —indicative of disruption on university and college campuses 
across America  — threatened Yale’s safety. Brewster diffused the hazards of rebellion by 
pragmatically modifying commitments to civility, discipline and the values of free speech.  
 May Day 1970 represented the height of Brewster’s political realism, as his speech 
combined appeals to academic conservatism with progressive social justice to appease multiple 
factions within the Yale faculty. After May Day, the climactic storm of the 1960s slowly 
subsided; in the words of one Yale administrator, “the steam let out.”9!The university and 
America found itself entering a decade of calmer waters. For Brewster, his pragmatism had led 
him to two simultaneous extremes on either end of the ideological spectrum. His earlier position 
against coeducation and his leniency towards student disruption, once politically expedient, had 
become embarrassing liabilities.  
The peacefulness of the 1970s provided an opportunity for Brewster to moderate his 
stances on both issues, and, in doing so, reshape his university. Two carefully-designed Yale 
faculty committees became the vehicles for that change. Chaired by the eminent political 
scientist Robert Dahl, the first committee endorsed admitting an equal number of men and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Chauncey, interview by author, February 14, 2013. 
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women in 1972. In doing so, Dahl and his colleagues provided Brewster the opportunity to 
retreat from his vow of “one thousand male leaders a year.” The second committee, led by 
historian C. Vann Woodward in 1975, established a nationally renowned code of freedom of 
expression at Yale. Woodward’s report allowed Brewster to refurbish his commitments to 
student discipline and free speech, commitments often sacrificed to survive the 1960s.  
In many ways, the story of pragmatism in the 1960s and moderation in the 1970s — 
Brewster’s story — is a lesson in the tactics of effective university governance, an under-
examined historical topic. In that first decade, Yale’s president held together the many, often-
warring factions within the university by deftly choosing stances that pleased the most 
quarrelsome groups in times of strife, typically the alumni and the students. And, in the 
subsequent quiet years, with the Dahl and Woodward committees, Brewster looked to his faculty 
to abrogate his promises to Old Blues and undergraduates.  
But this story is more: It is the story of American universities, and the country more 
broadly, reaffirming its identity after the turmoil of the 1960s. Seen together, the controversies 
over coeducation and student disruption were one debate about the boundaries of the Yale 
community: who should be a part of the Yale community and how should that community’s 
members act? Far from parochial, what went on in New Haven was news around the nation; and 
the Woodward and Dahl committees were part of a larger conversation to determine the 
landscape of higher education. They reflected academia and American society reimagining itself, 
not in the peak of 1960s social tension, but in the aftermath of the 1970s.  
This essay is divided thematically into two parts. The first examines the history of 
coeducation until 1972 and the proceedings of Robert Dahl’s committee. The second section 
tackles the legacy of student disruption at Yale and Woodward’s reaffirmation of discipline and 
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free speech in 1975. We should note that the past was not so neatly divided into concurrent 
timelines, but was instead an integrated milieu of events only divisible in retrospect into two 
separate narratives. Despite this drawback, a thematic approach simplifies the complex history of 
the twenty years spanning the 1960s and 1970s into a manageable format. However, for 
Kingman Brewster, his allies, and his enemies, the events did not sort into such distinct 
categories.   
******* 
In the fall of 1968, Yale’s chapter of Students For a Democratic Society (SDS), a national 
New Left organization, met with Brewster to lobby for coeducation. In the course of the 
conversation, Kingman made a seemingly offhanded remark: Yale would continue to educate 
“one thousand male leaders” in every college class. SDS leader Mark Zanger recalled that “I had 
even then a suspicion that he was playing us, that he wanted us to disseminate that quote.”10 The 
intended audience was Yale’s alumni. Brewster’s colleague and fellow Yale administrator Henry 
“Sam” Chauncey, Jr. agreed: the catchphrase was “forty percent” reflective of Brewster’s beliefs, 
but “sixty percent” an attempt to assuage traditionalist Yale graduates.11  
The motto of “one thousand male leaders” came to embody Brewster’s unwillingness to 
coeducate Yale, an unwillingness that extended both before and after that 1968 meeting with 
SDS leaders. But what led Kingman to so firmly oppose female undergraduates? And why did 
alumni opinion matter? It is to these questions that this essay turns. First, the essay draws upon 
existing scholarship to trace the history of coeducation at Yale from the beginning of Brewster’s 
presidency in 1963 to the admission of women in 1968 to the formation of Robert Dahl’s 
committee, which endorsed sex-blind admissions in 1972. Over those years, Kingman !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Mark Zanger, interview with Geoffrey Kabaservice, transcript, April 7, 1992, Griswold-Brewster History Project, 
Box 12, Folder 155. 
11 Chauncey, interview by author, February 14, 2013. 
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maintained a standoffish and traditionalist position on coeducation, backing himself into an 
increasingly isolated corner to maintain a friendly relationship with Yale alumni opposed to 
women at Yale. In this section, the essay examines the role of alumni in the context of university 
governance generally and Yale specifically. Second, the essay scrutinizes the inner workings of 
the Dahl Committee to argue that Brewster intended the committee to endorse full coeducation, 
providing him a shield behind which to moderate his extreme and public stance against an equal 
number of men and women at Yale without alienating his alumni base.  
In many ways, the campaign to coeducate Yale’ undergraduate body began with 
Kingman Brewster’s tenure as president.12 According to the leading historian of admissions in 
the Ivy League, Jerome Karabel, the university’s institutional identity was the most masculine of 
all campuses across America at the start of the 1960s, with the possible exception of the military 
academy at West Point.13 In the words of one woman at the time, Yale was a “totally male 
environment. Women just didn’t count. Women were sort of ornaments to the men.”14 Indeed, 
when Yale finally admitted women in 1969, the university’s press release announcing the change 
characterized the undergraduate college as “a male bastion.”15 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 A definitive history of admissions policies at Yale, Harvard, and Princeton in the twentieth century, Jerome 
Karabel’s The Chosen remains the best account of coeducation at Yale and a source on which this paper relies 
heavily. Jerome Karabel, The Chosen (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005). Geoffrey Kabaservice examines 
the campaign for coeducation in the context of university governance in his The Guardians. For another account of 
coeducation at Yale, though not as detailed as Karabel’s, see: Joseph Soares, The Power of Privilege: Yale and 
America’s Elite Colleges (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007). For a very brief chronology of coeducation, 
see also: “Coeducation at Yale College: A Brief Chronology” in Different Voices: A Journal of Coeducation at Yale 
ed. Rachel Donadio (New Haven: Different Voices, 1995). And, for a comparative analysis of coeducation at Yale 
and Princeton, see: Marcia Synnott, “A Friendly Rivalry: Yale and Princeton Pursue Parallel Paths to Coeducation,” 
in Going Coed: Women’s Experiences in Formerly Men’s Colleges and Universities, 1950-2000, ed. Leslie Miller-
Bernal and Susan L. Poulson (Nashville: Vanderbilt Press, 2004): 111-150. 
13 Karabel, The Chosen, 412. 
14 Elga Wasserman, interview by Geoffrey Kabaservice, transcript, May 7, 1992, Griswold-Brewster History 
Project, Box 4, Folder 54. 
15 Yale University Press Release, April 13, 1969, Office on the Education of Women, Yale University, Records (RU 
821). Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library, Box 1, Folder 4. 
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In 1962, tasked with crafting a strategic vision for the university, a Yale faculty 
committee established some form of coeducation as an abstract goal for the long-term future. 
Brewster, then the provost, responded to the report by proclaiming that any future plan for 
coeducation would operate on a “coordinate” basis — Yale would either partner with another 
female institution, such as the all women’s Vassar College, or build its own parallel school for 
women in New Haven. The university would not sacrifice its male identity. This project, he 
warned, would be costly: If it wanted to coeducate, Yale would “be in the market for windfall 
money,” needing to raise fifty million dollars to build the second sex a home inside the 
university’s ivy walls.16 From the outset, the issues of women at Yale and finances were 
intrinsically linked, and Brewster ruled out admitting female students because of the perceived 
cost. 
At the time, Brewster’s position on coeducation conformed to that of the student body 
and Yale’s alumni as a whole. Close to three quarters of undergraduates opposed the admission 
of women.17 A female presence on campus challenged the university’s masculine ethos. Many 
worried that women would eat at Mory’s, the all-male members-only restaurant that served as a 
faculty club. Worst of all, how could students concentrate with the ever-present “distraction” of 
the feminine form?18  
Almost two years later, opinion began to shift. In October of 1963, students protested 
outside of Woodbridge Hall, Yale’s main administrative building, urging the inclusion of the 
fairer sex.19 Had he been on campus that afternoon, Kingman Brewster would have occupied the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Jethro Liebeman and Alexander Sharp, “Women and Man at Yale,” Yale Daily News, May 9, 1962, 1. On the 
report, see also: Brooks Kelley, Yale: A History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 450-5.  
17 Karabel, The Chosen 414. Kelly argues that the report’s suggestion for coeducation shocked the alumni. Kelly, 
Yale: A History, 455. 
18 Jethro Liebeman and Alexander Sharp, “The Radical Change,” Yale Daily News, May 11, 1962, 1. 
19 Karabel, The Chosen, 415. 
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building’s corner office — after his predecessor’s death from cancer in April, provost Brewster 
had become acting president of the university.  
The pressure for coeducation would mount throughout the next six years, culminating in 
the admission of women at Yale in 1969. During that process, Brewster’s opposition to women 
at Yale, which he continued to attribute to the financial cost of building a coordinate college, 
remained constant. The local and national culture, though, increasingly rejected the idea of all-
male institutions. As a result, Brewster found himself occupying an originally moderate position 
that had grown increasingly conservative.  
The drive for coeducation mirrored a larger campaign for inclusion, both in New Haven 
and around the country. At Yale, the 1960s saw a conscious effort to diversify the student body 
to include blacks, Jews, and public schools students, constituencies previously unwelcome in the 
university.20 Nationally, the civil rights movement generated a moral impetus for the acceptance 
of African-Americans and other marginalized groups in higher education.21 In many ways, 
Yale’s quest to admit women reflected the nation’s changing landscape in the 1960s, as America 
struggled to integrate minorities in general and especially into those institutions that provided 
pathways to positions of leadership.  
In 1966, Kingman formally called for the formation of the coordinate college system with 
Vassar. One impetus for this new plan was that the children of Yale alumni were choosing 
schools like Harvard, with its sister school Radcliffe, over their fathers’ unisex alma mater.22 At 
the same time, Brewster feared displeasing conservative alumni.23 Coeducation with Vassar 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 Ibid., 320-409. 
21 Christopher Loss, Between Citizen’s and the State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 166-197. 
22 Soares, The Power of Privilege, 103-5; Kavaservice, The Guardians, 296; Karabel, The Chosen, 416. 
23 Kavaservice, The Guardians 297. 
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provided the perfect pragmatic solution. It both satisfied students’ desire for female compatriots 
and mollified those who wanted Yale to continue educating only men.24 
Reflecting Brewster’s compromise position, the Yale Corporation adopted a resolution in 
1966 calling for coeducation via the coordinate system. The resolution also insisted that Yale 
“not reduce the number of male freshmen.”25 However, Vassar rebuffed Yale’s offer of 
coordination a year later, choosing instead to admit men into its all-female student body.26 This 
unexpected rejection left Brewster flatfooted. Shortly afterward, in early 1968, Princeton 
announced that it would accept women, and vocal support for admitting women continued to 
grow among Yale students.  
Nevertheless, Brewster maintained his stated position: Yale should establish a separate 
women’s college, either through a coordinate system or by building such a college in New 
Haven. He estimated the cost of either project at a prohibitive thirty to fifty-five million dollars, 
roughly the same figures he had quoted in 1962.27 After his meeting with SDS leaders, Brewster 
insisted that Yale educate “a thousand male leaders” in every graduating class, a comment 
designed to placate traditionalist alumni. The number of male students would not decrease. 
Given that the admission of female students required either a large infusion of cash or the 
reduction in Brewster’s one thousand male leaders, Kingman effectively ruled coeducation out. 
But, in a “rare display of reformist initiative,” the Yale Corporation disagreed with its own 
president’s public declarations.28 Its members instructed him to admit five hundred women in the 
fall of 1969.29 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 Soares, The Power of Privilege, 107.  
25 Synnott, “A Friendly Rivalry,” 113; Karabel, The Chosen, 417. 
26 Ibid; Karabel, The Chosen, 418. 
27 Ibid.  
28 Soares, The Power of Privilege, 107. 
29 Synnott, “A Friendly Rivalry,” 117. It is possible that the Yale Corporation was actually more reluctant than 
Brewster to endorse coeducation, and that Brewster wanted the Corporation to overturn his public stance for 
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Why did Kingman Brewster want to please those alumni who opposed coeducation? 
What tangible benefit did they provide Yale’s president? In order to answer these two questions, 
we need to examine the nature of university governance more broadly, both at Yale and other 
American institutions of higher learning.30 
Reflecting on academia during the 1960s, Clark Kerr once compared the modern 
university to monarchical France, where the king balanced the interests of a variety of different 
“estates.” So too, for Kerr, the university president managed a comparable series of academic 
estates, juggling the wishes of faculty, students, and alumni, as well as state governments and 
corporations.31 To govern effectively, the ideal president cajoled, conceded and mediated a series 
of compromises that pleased each of these constituencies.32 And each estate possessed different 
types of power within the university: The faculty affected decisions within their departments. 
Students could protest or disrupt university functions. Governments could expand or contract the 
budgets of public institutions to exert pressure. For Kerr, a school’s alumni represented a “minor 
estate” whose ability to influence its alma mater was often weak in many universities.33  
A close friend of Kingman Brewster, Clark Kerr was well positioned to discuss higher 
education governance in the 1960s, having served first as chancellor of UC-Berkley and then 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
political reasons. According to one observer, in the meeting in which the Corporation affirmed its plans to admit 
women, Brewster authored the initial resolution. Prominent corporation members then revised Brewster’s draft to 
remove sections implying the university would eventually educate an equal number of men and women. See: John 
Embersits, interview with Geoffrey Kabaservice, transcript, June 15, 1992, Griswold-Brewster History Project, Box 
4, Folder 54. 
30 Scholarship on the history of university governance is deceptively broad but actually shallow. For the most part, 
the field remains the purview of social scientists, who tend to examine the topic from a highly technical vantage 
point. There are some exceptions to this rule. First published in 1960, Frederick Rudolph’s The American College 
and University examines the origins of modern university governance in America in his larger survey of higher 
education history. It remains one of the best texts in the field. Frederick Rudolph, The American College and 
University (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1960). For a more modern take on the same topic, see: Arthur 
Cohen, The Shaping of American Higher Education (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1998). 
31 Clark Kerr, The Great Transformation in Higher Education, 1960-1980 (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1991), 200. 
32 Ibid., 201. 
33 Ibid. 
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later as the president of the University of California system, just as those institutions began 
experiencing intense student unrest. 34 Heralded by Time as the “master planner” of American 
education, Kerr occupied a national stage, much like Brewster did from his prominent perch in 
New Haven. 35  
At Yale, the alumni estate possessed considerably more sway than the graduates of the 
typical university that Kerr depicted. But the Yale alumni’s power was not the power of the 
purse, a mistaken conclusion drawn by some commentators.36 Brewster did not oppose 
coeducation because he feared conservative donors would flee the university. The majority of 
Yale’s donations stemmed from the generosity of a few wealthy alumni, such as philanthropists 
Paul Mellon and John Hay Whitney, both of whom graduated from Yale College in the 1920s. 
Liberal on social issues such as coeducation, these men’s contributions far outweighed those of 
the average alumni.37 What is more, internal studies at Yale during the early 1970s found that 
those alumni who threatened to withhold money from the university had not been active donors 
in the past.38 Yale never stood to lose serious money if it adopted coeducation. 
Instead, the alumni possessed a kind of “parliamentary” power, according to Brewster’s 
aide and confidant Sam Chauncey. Like Clark Kerr, Kingman often remarked that he reigned 
over three “constituencies” — the faculty, the students, and the university’s graduates — and he 
could not “lose a majority of all of them.”39 While the Yale Corporation technically appointed 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 Chauncey, interview by author, February 14, 2013. 
35 “Master Planner,” Time, October 17, 1960. 
36 For an example of a modern commentator who saw alumni donations as a source of alumni authority, see Soares, 
The Power of Privilege, 107. 
37 On Whitney’s relationship to Yale, see: E. J. Kahn, Jr., Jock: The Life and Times of John Hay Whitney (New 
York: Doubleday, 1981), 297-319; on Paul Mellon, see: Paul Mellon, Reflections in a Silver Spoon (New York: 
Morrow, 1992). 
38 J. Richardson Dilworth, Memo to Endicott Davison, December 6, 1972, Vice-President for Development and 
Alumni Affairs, Yale University, Records (RU 537). Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library, Accession 
1979-A-053, Box 1, Folder 1. 
39 Chauncey, interview by author, February 14, 2013. 
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and removed presidents from office, a public loss of confidence in any of these estates would 
have tipped the Corporation’s hand and forced it to dethrone Kingman. 
Coeducation was by no means the only issue that rankled conservative Yalies in the 
1960s. The admission of minorities and fewer alumni children left many Old Blues feeling 
sour.40 Nor were the alumni the only estate in danger of revolting. As this essay discusses in 
greater detail in the second section, Brewster simultaneously faced student protest. In this 
environment of heightened discord, maintaining a stance against women at Yale mollified some 
alumni by preserving the masculine nature of Yale College. In part, Brewster’s personal views 
played into his pragmatic decision: Unlike African Americans or Jews, minorities he realized 
faced discrimination and who could contribute to society if given the opportunity, Brewster 
possessed traditional opinions about the opposite sex.41 Nevertheless, as Chauncey suggested, 
Brewster’s commitment to an all-male Yale largely stemmed from his desire to please 
traditionalists, an important segment of the alumni estate. 
“Yale Officially Begins Era of Coeducation” blared the Yale Daily News, on September 
3, 1969, as the first “coeds” stepped foot on campus.42 While women found seats in the 
classroom, their male counterparts still outnumbered them by overwhelming margins. Pressure 
quickly mounted to equalize the gender balance; Brewster instead doubled down on his pledge to 
educate one thousand men a year, a promise that excluded gender equality on campus. The 
tension came to a head in the spring of 1970, when hundreds of alumni gathered for a luncheon 
in New Haven. In a protest covered by national news outlets, forty students stormed the room, 
took the microphone, and demanded that the university admit more women, explicitly decrying 
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Kingman’s catchphrase.43 After the disruption, the president reclaimed the podium and offered a 
frank rejoinder that found its way into the next day’s press. In his words: The alumni deserved 
“accountability.” “One thousand male leaders” would remain the norm, for the sake of alumni 
“nostalgia.” Only by building two new residential buildings and expanding the entire student 
body could Yale possibly accommodate more women — an unlikely scenario given fiscal 
constraints. The assembled alumni applauded Brewster enthusiastically.44 According to 
Chauncey, Kingman thought the Old Blues would “skewer him if he [had] retreated from the 
principle of training a thousand men.”45   
Thus, to preserve a “parliamentary” majority of the alumni, Brewster maintained his 
commitment to a male-dominated college. But by 1971, he found himself at the extreme fringe 
of the ideological spectrum, committed to protecting “nostalgia.” He faced a quandary: Should 
the university maintain the status quo? Or should the student body increase in size, to 
accommodate more women? Or, more drastic yet, should Yale abandon the pledge to the alumni 
and decrease the number of men? Brewster opted for the third choice. Ever skillful at balancing 
the various estates over which he governed, he formed a carefully designed faculty committee 
whose mission was to re-imagine every aspect of Yale College. That group, Brewster knew, 
would endorse sex-blind admissions as part of its proceedings, providing him a graceful 
opportunity in which to relinquish his vision of “one thousand male leaders.” It is to that 
committee and its inner workings that we now turn. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 This was not, by any means, the only time that protestors attacked Brewster’s pledge to educated one thousand 
men. A few days after the alumni luncheon, leaflets distributed at a rally for coeducation decried Brewster’s 
“assumption…that Yale has a national commitment to produce 1000 leaders a year, and that only men can lead.” 
Unofficial Proposals for Equality, May Day Rally and Yale Collection, Box 4, Folder titled “Women and co-
education.” On national press at the luncheon protest, see for instance: Thomas Linden, “Yale Coeds Pushing for 
More Change” Los Angeles Times, March 1, 1970, E1; “Yale Coeds Invade Alumni Fete To Protest Male 
Predominance,” The New York Times, February 22, 1970, 1. 
44 Richard Fuchs, “Girls Demand Fewer Men, More Women,” Yale Daily News, February 23, 1969, 1.  
45 Henry “Sam” Chauncey, Jr., interview by author, transcription, December 6, 2011. 
Zelinsky 15!
******* 
In October of 1971, the Study Group on Yale College met for the first time. Three of the 
five people in the room were among Yale’s most accomplished professors. In the chairman’s seat 
sat Robert Dahl, an eminent political scientist whose groundbreaking study of New Haven 
politics, Who Governs?, was the urtext on urban democracy.46 One member, William Kessen, 
had pioneered the field of child developmental psychology.47 Another, physicist and incoming 
dean of Yale College Horace Taft, had been lauded that August by the New York Times as a rare 
“humanistic scientist,” who enjoyed playing Bach when not in the laboratory.48 Not as nationally 
renowned but certainly a public face at Yale, Brewster’s special assistant on matters of 
coeducation Elga Wasserman occupied the fourth place at the table. The final member of the 
Study Group, the much younger Jonathan Spence, remembered being “startled” to find himself 
alongside “the most respected and admired faculty” in the university.49  
Appointed by Brewster, the five-person committee enjoyed an extremely broad mandate: 
Examine what “the task of undergraduate education at Yale ought to be for the next couple of 
decades.”50 No stone was to be unturned. Dahl and his colleagues were to concern themselves 
with finances, coeducation, the residential colleges, and every other aspect of undergraduate 
life.51 For the next year, the group — colloquially known as the Dahl Committee — 
systematically researched for “unbelievable hours.”52 The members surveyed faculty, students, 
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and alumni to gather a wide swath of opinions; they examined the recommendations of past and 
current Yale committees; and they studied peer institutions in the hope of learning from other 
schools’ best practices.  
Finally, in 1972, this working group published a one hundred and seventeen page report 
calling for sweeping changes to Yale. Among Dahl’s recommendations: A longer academic 
calendar, a three-year baccalaureate degree program, and a plan for faculty mentorship of 
students. The committee also endorsed complete coeducation, writing that undergraduate 
admissions should be “granted on the basis of qualifications without regard to sex.”53 After 
heated debate, the faculty rejected the more innovative academic suggestions. In contrast, the 
Yale Corporation adopted sex-neutral admissions. 
Brewster tasked Dahl with the monumental mission of compiling a holistic vision for 
Yale College; determining the status of women on campus was a substantial, though by no 
means defining, aspect of that project. Two larger factors, student disaffection with the academic 
environment in the 1960s and the declining economy of the early 1970s, had led to the 
committee’s sweeping assignment. Brewster meant the Dahl Committee to reinvent Yale for the 
modern age — to forge a new, financially secure institution that appealed to the most talented 
undergraduates. Because coeducation intersected both the fiscal and academic aspects of the 
university, the Study Group addressed that particular issue in this moment of institutional 
redefinition. 
Nationally, the early 1960s saw students rebel against the traditional liberal arts 
education. At colleges across the country, undergraduates demanded a more relevant curriculum, 
calling for both novel ways of teaching that eschewed the impersonal lecture hall and new 
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content that spoke to the immediate problems of American society.54 Toward the end of the 
decade, universities established African American studies program and began forming women’s 
studies departments, reflecting the desires of a more diverse student body that protested 
vigorously for change.55  
Partially in response to the demand for different curricula, institutions of higher learning 
entered a period of self-reflection, best epitomized by the Carnegie Commission on Higher 
Education. Led by Clark Kerr and funded by the Carnegie Foundation from 1967 until 1973, the 
Commission was seen as “the most extensive examination of America’s universities and colleges 
to date,” publishing over fifty books on topics ranging from university governance to 
curriculum.56 The Study Group on Yale College mirrored this national trend in academic soul 
searching. When he formed the committee, Brewster publicly told the Dahl Committee its task 
was to re-think “the objectives and functions of college education,” leading to “a comprehensive 
reappraisal.”57 Thus, in 1971, Yale and other schools found themselves in a moment of what 
appeared to be immense academic transition. 
In addition, an increasingly depressed American economy threatened many universities’ 
financial stability, as reductions in federal funding and falling endowment returns stripped 
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budgets.58 At Yale, Brewster projected a four to five million dollar operating deficit for the 1971-
2 academic year.59 The university cut library hours and other essential services to try to fill the 
gap, but, despite these efforts, structural reform seemed necessary to stem the difference between 
revenue and expenses.60 Consequently, Brewster ordered the Study Group to “especially” 
concentrate on the “financial feasibility” of its vision for Yale College.61 
The issue of coeducation touched on both the academic and financial purviews of Robert 
Dahl’s mandate. Whom Yale admitted reflected who most deserved education — a contested 
question central to the “objective” of Yale College that Dahl was supposed to define. Moreover, 
since the inception of the coordinate plan for coeducation in 1962, Brewster had consistently 
quoted the cost of increasing the student body at approximately fifty million dollars. Admitting 
additional women, without reducing the number of men, would have required cash the university 
did not have. Even a promised “windfall” gift from the wealthy Corporation member and alum 
John Hay Whitney to build two new residential colleges would not have solved Brewster’s fiscal 
dilemma. If the university expanded its physical plant to accommodate more women, fixed costs 
for related expenses would have also increased.62  
 The Dahl Committee resolved this dilemma by calling for sex-blind admissions and an 
equal number of men and women on campus. Most scholars depict this recommendation as a 
blow to Kingman Brewster and his pledge to educate one thousand male leaders. That standard 
narrative, though, is incorrect.63 A savvy university politician, Brewster likely wanted the 
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committee to overturn his previous opposition to women at Yale. He included his assistant on 
matters of coeducation, Elga Wasserman, on the Dahl Committee knowing that she would push 
the Study Group to endorse complete coeducation. Moreover, Wasserman’s records and the 
committee’s minutes suggest that she and her colleagues intentionally authored their report with 
Brewster’s political machinations in mind. And, after its publication, Brewster touted Dahl’s 
report in such a way as to convince Yale’s alumni of the importance of coeducation. The Study 
Group championed the positions he could not advance without contradicting himself and thus 
provided Yale’s president the cover he wanted and needed to retreat from his earlier positions 
regarding coeducation.  
 The composition of the Study Group was no accident. Brewster picked loyal senior faculty 
whom he trusted and who would engender the trust of students and alumni. Robert Dahl and 
William Kessen topped the list of people whose counsel Yale’s president consistently sought.64 
Brewster particularly relied upon Dahl to handle delicate situations, previously tapping the 
author of Who Governs? to write a landmark report on tenure in 1966 and to pioneer the African 
American Studies department. Dahl initially abhorred these assignments, having once threatened 
to leave Yale unless Brewster wrote him a letter freeing him of these “administrative 
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responsibilities.” That assurance became something of a joke between the two men, as president 
Brewster repeatedly approached Dahl with various requests.65 
 Moreover, Dahl “was seen as one of the great mediators” of the university; he was fair, 
honest, and open-minded.66 In April of 1969, four thousand Yale students and faculty gathered in 
Ingalls Hockey rink to debate the status of ROTC on campus. The meeting threatened to turn 
raucous when the students shouted down provost Charles Taylor, the moderator, who planned to 
accept only pre-selected speeches. Dahl was chosen by consensus to replace Taylor, a result that 
placated the unruly faculty and students. The meeting proceeded without a hitch, with orderly 
speeches from the floor.67 Dahl’s reputation would lend the Study Group’s recommendations — 
including and exceeding complete coeducation — substantial credibility. 
 But did Brewster intend the Dahl Committee to endorse sex-blind admissions? It 
certainly seems so. By appointing Elga Wasserman to the committee, he knew that she would 
support an increased female population at Yale. In 1968, Brewster hired Wasserman, then an 
administrator and scientist in the Graduate School, to manage Yale College’s transition to a 
coeducated environment. The two developed a close relationship, as they together tackled the 
many dilemmas of integrating coeds into an all-male environment.68  
 While Wasserman faithfully executed Brewster’s directives as his assistant, she also 
played the part of the loyal opposition, consistently advocating for more female undergraduates. 
In the first year of coeducation, women often complained to her that they “just didn’t like the 
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[gender] ratio.” In particular, it was difficult to find “suitable roommates” with so few female 
peers on campus.69 Elga took up their cause. Her initial report on the progress of coeducation 
advocated doubling the number of women at Yale.70  She also abhorred Brewster’s commitment 
to one thousand male leaders. Dining at a Radcliffe alumnae luncheon in New York when the 
president first coined his catchphrase, Wasserman remembered that the comment “didn’t sit very 
well” with her.71 As she pressured the president to fully embrace coeducation, she forced 
Kingman to remind her in writing of his “unambiguous statement” to “not reduce the admissions 
of men to Yale College.”72 Nevertheless, in her position as the chief women’s advocate at Yale, 
Wasserman remained devoted to complete equality of the sexes on campus. 
 When he appointed the Dahl Committee in 1971, Brewster publicly told the Study Group 
that “no one of you is ‘representative’ of your rank, or field, or other ‘constituency.’ Indeed, you 
collectively have no constituency.”73 In part, his comment preempted the inevitable criticism that 
the body lacked even the semblance of diversity. Four of the committee members were white 
men, three of whom were senior faculty; the most junior, Jonathan Spence, was English by birth, 
speaking with a lilted accent more patrician than plebian. At a time when African Americans 
asked for increased representation in university governance, the lack of a minority member on 
the panel was a sure source of contention. Had he only included Dahl and the other men on the 
panel, the president’s statement may have smoothed some of that friction.  
However, Brewster’s assurance that no member of the panel was a “representative” of a 
“constituency” clashed with Wasserman’s place on the Study Group — her prime qualification !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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was being the female assistant to the president for coeducation. In retrospect, Chauncey noted 
that Brewster “had to put Elga on, both because of her background and because [he had no other 
viable women].”74 Brewster’s claim that Wasserman was anything but Yale’s female advocate 
was pure ipse dixit. 
 Yale’s black community quickly highlighted Brewster’s inattention to minorities on the 
Dahl Committee. Director of African American Studies Roy S. Bryce-Laporte wrote to the 
president that he was shocked by the “invisibility of Blacks …whether as members of the 
Committee or as a crucial component for consideration.” For Bryce-Laporte, this perceived slight 
was especially galling, given that Brewster had directed the Study Group to focus on the plight 
of female students and had appointed his “Director of Coeducation” to Dahl’s committee.75 
Brewster uncharacteristically exposed himself to criticism in the arena of racial politics by 
explicitly focusing on the needs of women over other minorities. That he did so spoke to 
importance of the Study Group as a vehicle for resolving the issue of Yale’s gender ratio. 
 After having been assigned to Dahl’s team, Wasserman all but informed Brewster that 
she would use the committee to achieve an increased female presence on campus. In an August 
1971 progress report on coeducation sent to the president, she noted that, if the Study Group 
“makes specific recommendations concerning the long range course of coeducation at Yale, it 
could have a major effect on the future course of the education of women at Yale and 
elsewhere.”76 The report also expressed hope that the Dahl Committee could achieve “a better 
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balance of men and women in Yale College.”77 Wasserman’s vision for the Dahl Committee was 
no secret.  
In fact, there is evidence that Wasserman and other faculty who desired complete 
coeducation pressured Brewster to make her part of the Study Group. The University Committee 
on Coeducation, a group that Wasserman chaired, met in February of 1972, only two months 
before the Dahl Committee released its final report that April. With Wasserman absent, the 
committee debated writing a letter urging Brewster to adopt sex-blind admissions. According to 
the minutes, one member noted that, “our Committee played a major part in the appointment of 
the Dahl Committee.” Why not wait for Elga and that body to make the decision for Kingman?78 
And she did just that, authoring the Dahl Report’s section on coeducation that January.79 
Did Brewster and Wasserman privately conspire for the latter to endorse gender-neutral 
admissions at the former’s behest? Did Kingman discuss the matter with Dahl, his loyal faculty 
agent? We cannot know for sure. Jonathan Spence remembered receiving no firm directives, 
implied or explicit, from the president — as junior faculty, though, he may not have been privy 
to Brewster’s political maneuvering.80 What is safe to infer: In appointing Wasserman to the 
Study Group, Brewster knew the committee would recommend an increase in female students, 
undermining the president’s pledge to a male-dominated university. 
On the optimal size of Yale College, a matter closely related to coeducation, the Dahl 
Committee did consider the president’s wishes. The story plays out in the Study Group’s 
minutes. On October 14, 1971, Dahl retold to the committee a conversation between himself and 
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George Langdon, a deputy provost. According to Langdon, the provost and treasurer desired a 
larger student body to raise revenue. Brewster, though, disagreed, and wanted to preserve the 
existing size of Yale College. The president, Langdon implied, “might be better able to resist 
pressure for an increase if the Study Group comes down hard against an increase.”81 The 
following day, the committee met again, and Dahl mused that the group should adopt a firm 
stance against an “increase [in] size.” 82 While other factors likely also influenced Dahl’s 
ultimate decision, this evidence suggests that the committee understood that it served Brewster’s 
interests. 
Regardless of whether its members were conscious coconspirators, Kingman used the 
Study Group as a shield behind which he could endorse full coeducation. In February, the 
president announced that any adjustment in the ratio of women would await the recommendation 
of the Dahl Committee. In his words, to unilaterally reduce the number of men would violate his 
“commitment” to the alumni. If, on the other hand, he admitted more female undergraduates as 
part of an “overall reassessment of the future of Yale College,” Brewster would preserve the 
alumni’s “confidence.”83 The president thus strived to incorporate coeducation into a larger 
narrative of academic change. A moment of institutional self-reflection became a modern-day 
Sabbatical year in which Kingman could break his past promises of “one thousand male leaders.” 
In April, Dahl’s committee published The Report of The Study Group on Yale College, 
and Yale aggressively marketed its various recommendations, including full coeducation. The 
university printed ten thousand copies; every alumnus who donated more than five thousand 
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dollars received one in the mail.84 For the less generous, the Yale Alumni Magazine printed an 
abridged version of the report in a special issue that devoted substantial attention to the proposal 
for sex-blind admissions.85 University officials personally lobbied reporters from leading outlets, 
such as Time and Newsweek, to write about the Dahl Committee.86 And their efforts met with 
success. A few newspapers, including the New York Times, reported on the Study Group’s report, 
analyzing the proposal for a three-year undergraduate degree and summer classes side-by-side 
the call for more women on campus.87 Through this varied public relations campaign, Brewster 
successfully situated coeducation within the broader context of the holistic reexamination of both 
Yale College and the purposes of higher education. 
Ironically, that holistic vision for Yale failed to materialize in almost every aspect— 
except for the admission of more women. At a meeting that May, the vast majority of professors 
rejected the Study Group’s proposals, condemning year-round teaching as burdensome.88 Dahl’s 
report quickly became something of a joke in the Yale community. When a group of senior 
faculty met to play charades a few months later, one person mimed the Dahl Committee by 
yawning.89 By contrast, coeducation’s advocates touted Dahl. In October of 1972, six months 
after the Study Group had disbanded, the Committee on Coeducation publicly exhorted Brewster 
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to adopt the report’s policies on admissions.90 In November, the president delayed any final 
decision on the number of female undergraduates until the Alumni Association could survey its 
members. Then, in December, the Yale Corporation formally eliminated quotas for women while 
simultaneously maintaining the size of the student body — though they also paradoxically 
established an “optimal” composition of Yale College as sixty percent male.91 At that moment, 
Kingman’s commitment to one thousand leaders was officially a promise of the past. 
******* 
 In Who Governs, Robert Dahl examined New Haven as a case study of how various factions 
exerted influence in urban politics. Given Dahl’s prominent place in this story, it is fitting to ask, 
“Who governed Yale?” Starting in 1962, the alumni estate (to use Clark Kerr’s term) dictated the 
pace of coeducation. To please them, Brewster dragged his feet on admitting women, first 
advocating the Vassar merger, then touting the formation of a coordinate college, and finally 
vowing to preserve one thousand male leaders.  
 By 1971, this position had become untenable. So Kingman employed the powers of another 
estate, the faculty, to check alumni influence. Realizing he could not retreat from his stance 
unilaterally, he reframed the issue of coeducation as part of a larger, institutional reformation. If 
Yale College were to substantially transform its character, his promises to the old-guard would 
no longer apply. In Dahl and his colleagues, Brewster collected a loyal cadre. Without explicitly 
telling them to (as far as we can tell), the president knew they would endorse sex-blind 
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admissions, particularly so given Wasserman’s place on the Study Group. Brewster used them to 
moderate his extreme position.  
 Would the Corporation have abolished quotas without Dahl’s Report? Would Brewster have 
been able to revise his commitment to one male thousand leaders by himself? While we can 
never definitively answer these counterfactuals, we can say how Brewster governed Yale: 
through forming coalitions, first with his alumni and then with his faculty. On the issue of 
coeducation, he tacked to an increasingly conservative position and then gracefully triangulated 
himself a new course.  
 America followed Brewster’s story. From the Vassar plan, to the protest at the 1970 alumni 
luncheon, to the final decision to reject gender quotas, the struggle for women to become Elis 
received national attention. In the public limelight, Yale shed its older skin and redefined who 
deserved to be a part of the university community. We turn now to the intertwined issues of 
student disruption, discipline, and free speech where Kingman similarly and publicly bent to the 
pressures of the 1960s and then forged a more moderate path in the early 1970s. If the Study 
Group determined the composition of Yale’s student body, then the Committee on Freedom of 
Expression chaired by C. Vann Woodward outlined how those new students should act. Just as 
Dahl’s committee represented a moment of institutional reexamination, Woodward’s represented 
a high-water-mark in Kingman’s efforts to reshape the Yale community.  
******* 
 “Disruption is not a valid part of the University…You are all subject to academic 
suspension.” Yale’s Secretary, Kingman Brewster’s right hand man, and the second most 
powerful person on campus in 1974, Henry “Sam” Chauncey Jr. faced a crowd of jeering 
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students in the largest lecture hall at Yale. The noise of the protestors was deafening. They 
clapped, stomped, and chanted — and generally ignored Chauncey’s proclamation.  
 On the lecture hall’s stage sat William Shockley, the distinguished inventor of the transistor 
who, late in his life, had become an advocate for the sterilization of minorities he judged racially 
inferior. Alongside him was William Rusher, editor of the conservative magazine National 
Review. The two had intended to debate the morality of Shockley’s views in front of a student 
audience. The assembled crowd of two hundred and fifty had a different idea: Drown Shockley 
out, in violation of university rules, denying him an opportunity to voice his offensive ideas. 92 
On the street outside, an even larger group protested behind roped picket lines, chanting 
“Shockley, Nazi. Shockley, Nazi.” 93 A few threw rocks, but, for the most part, they eschewed 
violence in favor of a civil demonstration. Inside, a different story prevailed. For seventy-five 
minutes, as Chauncey bit his lip and frowned, the raucous student disruptors prevented Shockley 
from speaking.94 After an hour and fifteen minutes, Shockley and Rusher departed without 
debating, and the protestors disbanded victorious. 
 The Shockley incident, as it became known, was no anomaly in 1974, either at Yale or for 
the nation. Starting in the early 1960s, college-age protestors affiliated with the New Left had 
adopted increasingly confrontational tactics, many of which found their origin in the sit-ins of 
the civil rights movement. On campuses across the nation, students married these methods with a 
philosophy of direct action, occupying classrooms or heckling speakers to highlight issues 
ranging from the Vietnam War to the rights of workers. As a result, the normally distinct issues 
of freedom of expression at universities and student discipline became intertwined over the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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decade. Students disrupted lectures that they deemed offensive or immoral, and academic 
administrators punished (or failed to punish) demonstrators for violating academia’s core 
principles. Yale proved a typical and highly visible setting for unrest, experiencing a wave of 
disruptions beginning in 1963. To prevent the university from erupting into flames, Kingman 
Brewster typically acceded to student demands, pragmatically sacrificing principles of discipline 
and free speech to satisfy protestors. 
 After Shockley, Brewster found himself increasingly criticized by moderates among his 
faculty and alumni who decried his failures to preserve order on campus. Just as he had with 
coeducation, Brewster found himself occupying an extreme position, this time lenient toward 
unrest. To repair his broken image and maintain a coalition of support within two disaffected 
academic estates of the university, Brewster again looked to a faculty committee. Led by C. 
Vann Woodward, that group authored a nationally renowned document that condemned 
disruption, upheld the values of free speech and tolerance, and provided Brewster an opportunity 
to remold his and Yale’s reputation.95  
 This section of the essay is divided into two parts. The first traces the history of unrest at 
Yale in the national context and documents the growing dissatisfaction among some with 
Brewster’s management of Yale’s campus. The second section examines the results of the 
Woodward Committee and argues that, just as he had with the Study Group on Yale College, 
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Brewster designed this body to achieve a specific political result intended to rehabilitate his 
image. 
 Like coeducation, the issue of unrest and free speech first arose while Brewster was the 
acting president of Yale in 1963. On September 19, the Yale Daily News reported that the 
Political Union, a student group, had invited Alabama Governor George Wallace to speak on 
campus that November.96 Four days earlier, a bomb had exploded in a black church in 
Birmingham, Alabama, killing four African-American children. Civil rights leaders, including 
Marin Luther King, Jr. and the head of the NAACP, Roy Wilkins, blamed Wallace for inspiring 
the bombing by voicing vocal segregationist opinions in the preceding years.97 Convinced that 
hosting the governor at Yale might inflame tensions among New Haven’s sizable black 
population, Brewster met privately with students in the days before September 19 to urge them to 
rescind the invitation.98 Immediately after the Yale Daily publicized the invitation, Mayor 
Richard Lee publicly announced that Wallace was “officially unwelcome” in the Elm City.99 The 
same day, the Political Union publicly announced that it had retracted its offer, and Brewster 
issued a press release that stated he was “grateful” for “this decision in the interest of law and 
order.”100 
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 To most observers around the country, it seemed that Brewster had caved to both Lee’s 
pressure and to the threat of violence from members of the New Haven black community.101 For 
the president, pragmatic concerns of preventing bloodshed outweighed the principle of free 
expression. In an editorial, the New York Times decried the loss of free inquiry at Yale.102 
Seeking to rehabilitate the university’s image as a bastion of free expression, a group of law 
students re-invited Wallace, who declined this second opportunity; Brewster offered his firm 
support for the Governor’s right to speak on campus, backpedaling from his previous statements. 
But, despite these efforts at repair, Kingman’s reputation suffered. Some trustees questioned his 
fitness as president given his failure to artfully navigate the incident.103 Their reluctance was no 
doubt compounded by the memory of Brewster’s predecessor, A. Whitney Griswold, who had 
been a national advocate for academic freedom during the McCarthyism of the 1950s. According 
to Sam Chauncey, the scandal deeply affected Brewster. In later years, when making a “major 
institutional decision,” Kingman would often tell his assistant, “I’ve got to make sure I don’t 
make the kind of mistake I made in the Wallace case.”104  
 In the Wallace affair, the threat of disruption originated outside the university in New 
Haven’s inner city. With the emergence of the Free Speech Movement, a year later, similar 
unrest found its way onto college campuses. The Movement began at Berkeley, when students 
led by Mario Savio occupied an administrative building to challenge rules prohibiting political 
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activism on university property. Active civil rights demonstrators, Savio and his compatriots had 
participated in sit-ins, both in California and the South. They applied those confrontational 
tactics to the university setting, refusing to leave the building until they achieved their 
demands.105 University officials found themselves with few options: Either give-in to the 
occupiers wishes or spark an altercation by confronting the students. At Yale and schools around 
America, administrators watched the proceedings in Berkeley with rapt interest, little knowing 
that similar protests would shortly materialize in their own quads.106  
  After President Johnson announced an aggressive military commitment in Vietnam in 1965, 
student unrest became increasingly violent.107 Ivy League campuses were often the sites of 
public disruptions. At Columbia, with somewhat mixed motivations, students protested the war 
and a proposed university construction project by occupying a series of buildings — only to be 
evicted forcibly by the New York Police Department. Cornell saw a particularly violent takeover 
of its classrooms by armed African-American undergraduates who called for the formation of an 
African American Studies department. That university agreed to their demands, in what became 
a national symbol of appeasement to student violence and a breakdown in the system of 
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academic discipline.108 Incidents of unrest peaked during the 1969-70 academic year, when 
campuses across the country experienced 9,400 separate disruptions.109!!
 Brewster’s Yale actually defied the trend of unrest until November of 1969, when the 
university saw a major student occupation. A classics professor at Cornell during its period of 
upheaval, Donald Kagan remembered that Yale seemed like “the one place in the country where 
things seemed to be in good control.” When he accepted a faculty position in New Haven, his 
colleagues in Ithaca told him how lucky he was to be moving to a stable university.110 They 
admired Kingman’s firm and vocal stance against disruption, embodied in a document Brewster 
had published in the spring of 1969.111* What became known as the “Brewster scenario” started 
as an “intellectual exercise” in how Yale would face an event similar to those at Columbia or 
Cornell.112 The scenario mapped out a policy of “flexibility and firmness” in the face of 
disruption: The president would propose meeting with protesting students in another forum to 
address their requests. If students rejected the offer, they would be “subject to immediate 
suspension.” And if, even after suspension, students continued to interfere with university 
personal and property, administrators would call the campus police.113 On paper, the Brewster 
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scenario advertised a “hard-line” yet pragmatic approach that combined a commitment to 
discipline and civility with a tone of respect for student radicals.114 
 Unfortunately, Brewster’s scenario for a disruption disintegrated in its first test case in 
1969. When the university fired a black dining worker for rudeness, sixty students affiliated with 
SDS protested her abrupt dismissal by occupying her bosses’ offices in the dingy basement of 
Wright Hall. They refused to leave until the fired worker regained her job. With Brewster out of 
town on a Caribbean vacation, the job of defusing the situation fell to Sam Chauncey and 
Provost Charles Taylor. The two men were flummoxed — they had expected protests at major 
university buildings, not an obscure location like Wright Hall. In retrospect, Chauncey 
remembered, “we were kind of winging it.”115 Per the Brewster scenario, they suspended forty-
seven students who refused to leave. (The students only later left after officials agreed to rehire 
the dismissed employee.)116  
A faculty-student coalition formed immediately to reinstate the suspended occupiers. One 
professor lauded sit-ins as a “defensible tactic.”117 In an unexpected twist, the university 
executive committee responsible for student discipline commuted the sentences, citing a desire to 
show “mercy.”118 Brewster’s famed scenario failed completely. William Kessen noted that his 
colleagues were “dramatically divided,” a sentiment which others echoed.119 The president 
himself was livid that his normally loyal faculty had betrayed him.120 But in an odd way, the 
disloyal professors seemed very Brewster-esque in retrospect. They pragmatically abandoned !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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disciplinary principles — enshrined in the Brewster’s scenario — to mollify their angry peers 
and students. 
Five months later, May Day rocked New Haven, and, as a nation watched, Brewster 
reassumed the mantle of the high priest of pragmatism. In the days before the Bobby Seale trial 
and mass protests, he eschewed any rigid ideals he might have held, telling Sam Chauncey that 
their objectives were simple: no deaths, no burnings, and no academic disruption — in that order. 
In Chauncey’s words, Kingman ““[p]ragmatically developed [his principles] to fit what we 
thought the circumstances would be.”121 Yale officials opened doors to the Black Panthers, 
Yippies, and assorted other demonstrators, even feeding them in the hope that, satiated, the mob 
would not attack the university.122 When Brewster publicly doubted the ability of a black man to 
receive justice in America, commentators saw a former law professor sacrifice his faith in the 
legal system to placate radicals on the streets.123 And he succeeded: no one died at Yale. Four 
days later, National Guardsmen shot and killed students at Kent State. There, but for pragmatism 
and the grace of God, went Kingman.  
In the aftermath of May Day, Brewster found himself in a political maelstrom. He had 
effectively closed the university, worse bent his commitment to the American legal system, in 
the face of the threat of violence. The pushback was strong. That summer, a collection of 
conservative alumni formed Lux et Veritas, Incorporated, citing the president’s speech about the 
Seale trial as a chief grievance and calling for broad reform at Yale.124 In a mailing to their 
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fellow Yale graduates, the group worried their alma mater was turning into an institution that 
smothered “opposing viewpoints.”125 
 While LEVI, as the organization became known, never attracted much support, it 
implied a more widespread discontent among Yale graduates. Letters criticizing Kingman poured 
into the president’s office, some so harsh that an aide remarked they “should have been written 
on asbestos.” 126 Capping off an academic year that also saw the beginning of coeducation, May 
Day became a “lighting rod” for all the alumni “anxieties” at Yale.127!!Sensing that he could lose 
the alumni estate altogether, Brewster created a special committee to investigate bettering 
relations with Old Blues.128 Worse than the alumni revolt, many in the faculty reacted negatively 
as well to Brewster’s comments about the American judiciary, though they praised his overall 
handling of May Day.129 In the summer of 1970, Kingman was ironically branded a radical, just 
as he was about to begin the process of restoring his image via the Dahl Committee. 
Nationally, student protests and occupations peaked and petered out after 1970, but the 
unlucky Brewster faced more moments of unrest that morphed into embarrassing incidents. The 
same day the Study Group released its report in April of 1972, General William Westmoreland, 
the former commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam, visited campus to deliver a speech at the 
Political Union. A large and pugnacious student crowd gathered to protest his talk; 
Westmoreland refused to speak publicly out of fear for his safety.130 Brewster tried and failed to 
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appear moderate, paradoxically criticizing both the General for balking in front of an unruly 
crowd and the students for their “reprehensible” tactics.131 Once again, Yale seemed lawless and 
Brewster weak in the eyes of the nation, his alumni, and his professorial peers.  
 The figurative straw that broke Brewster’s back came in the winter and spring of 1974. 
That January, the Political Union (ever the instigator of free speech crises on campus) invited 
William Shockley to debate Roy Innis, the chairman of the Congress on Racial Equality. A 
Stanford professor, Shockley made a name for himself touting racist genetic theories about the 
mental inferiority of blacks.132 African-American and Hispanic student groups vowed to prevent 
the Union’s debate from proceeding, using whatever means necessary.133 Their threats proved 
premature: In a scene reminiscent of Wallace’s visit, the Union’s leadership voted to disinvite 
both Innis and Shockley.  
 Shortly thereafter, a campus organ of the alumni society Lux et Veritas, Inc. reinvited 
both men to New Haven, ostensibly to test the principles of free expression on Yale’s campus. In 
an awkwardly hedged statement, Brewster defended the right of students to bring an offensive 
speaker to campus, while simultaneously condemning LEVI’s “lack of sensitivity.”134 Claiming 
an “atmosphere of intimidation” created by the president, the alumni organization canceled the 
event. Yet another student group decided to host the debate in March, only to retract its plans 
after receiving “threats emanating from members of the Yale Community.”135Finally, that April, 
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Yale’s Young Americans for Freedom (YAF) chapter successfully brought Shockley to New 
Haven, only for Shockley to be shouted down in the events described above.  
Because of Shockley’s national infamy, Brewster found himself under attack for failing 
to maintain a campus that respected the values of free speech. Conservative columnist and 
prominent Yale graduate William F. Buckley, Jr. criticized Kingman for failing to protect YAF’s 
debate from disruption. (Buckley may have been particularly sensitive to the affair because 
Shockley’s debating partner, William Rusher, was the publisher of Buckley’s National 
Review.)136 News outlets highlighted Yale’s seeming incivility compared to peer institutions: 
Shockley had previously spoken, with no incident, at Princeton, Columbia, and Amherst.137 
Senior professors at Yale were mutinous: distinguished faculty, including some of Kingman’s 
confidants, demanded his unambiguous support of free speech.138* Those faculty’s worst fears 
were confirmed when the university executive committee voted in May to allow twelve students 
suspended for participating in the Shockley affair to return to campus that coming fall. It seemed 
like the Wright Hall sit-in all over again — no serious penalties for disruption at Yale. 
In the summer of 1974, Brewster was beleaguered. He faced dissention from alumni and 
professors alike; the pragmatic approach that had prevented violence, starting with Wallace and 
ending with May Day, made him appear unprincipled and weak. Jonathan Fanton, his special 
assistant, recalled sharing one morose evening with his boss at Kingman’s summer home on !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Martha’s Vineyard. As the sun descended, Brewster smoked and mused about retiring — it 
seemed he had lost the parliamentary majority needed to govern Yale effectively. By the end of 
the conversation, night had fallen, and Fanton could only see a ghostly image of Kingman’s face, 
outlined by the glowing tip of his cigar.139 In his moment of melancholy, Brewster turned to a 
second faculty committee to reshape his image, one that crafted a renewed persona both for him 
and for Yale. 
******* 
Chaired by historian C. Vann Woodward and composed of thirteen faculty and students, 
the Committee on Freedom of Expression met in the fall term of 1974. Unlike Dahl’s Study 
Group, which Brewster formed to address a variety of problems of which coeducation was but 
one, Woodward’s committee possessed a single purpose: to reaffirm Yale’s commitment to the 
intertwined issues of student discipline and free speech. And the group did just that, publishing 
its report in the early days of 1975. That document addressed disruption and freedom of 
expression in three sections. The first offered a philosophical defense of free speech and a 
refutation of those who sought to squelch offending viewpoints through sit-ins, shout-downs, and 
other disruptive tactics. In the eyes of the committee, the university should provide a space “to 
think the unthinkable, discuss the unmentionable, and challenge the unchallengeable.”140 The 
report summarily rejected those who “assert[ed] a right to prevent free expression,” and called 
for “formal sanctions” against disrupters.141 The second section offered an historical overview of 
disruption at Yale, from Governor Wallace through Shockley. The third proposed penalties for 
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protestors who violated the rules: suspension or expulsion.142 Twelve of the thirteen committee 
members signed the report; one student refused to join the majority and wrote a dissenting, 
rambling manifesto that argued only “responsible” speech should be permitted inside a 
university’s walls.143 The report was not groundbreaking: its disciplinary recommendations 
conformed closely to the Brewster-scenario developed seven years before. However, 
Woodward’s committee offered a seemingly fresh articulation of Yale’s values.  
As he had with the Dahl committee, Kingman constructed the Committee on Freedom of 
Expression with an intended result. He chose loyal faculty whom he knew would provide him 
with a resounding and respected denunciation of student disruption. Chairman C. Vann 
Woodward was a life-long advocate of free speech who openly despised the New Left’s coercive 
tactics. Moreover, Woodward’s background as a prominent civil rights activist and esteemed 
historian lent his committee’s report substantial legitimacy. Brewster also included among the 
group Lloyd Cutler, an alumnus and ad hoc adviser, who protected the president’s personal 
interests; Cutler forced the normally scrupulous Woodward to whitewash Brewster’s 
involvement in embarrassing events. Finally, when the Committee on Freedom of Expression 
produced its stirring defense of civility and order, Kingman advocated stricter penalties for 
student disrupters than the committee itself had recommended. As a result of Woodward’s report 
and his own political machinations, Brewster positioned himself to appear a firm disciplinarian, 
despite the prior failures of the Brewster-scenario to protect both discipline and speech at Yale.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
142 Ibid., 35. 
143 Ibid., 46. 
Zelinsky 41!
In 1974, C. Vann Woodward was the most prominent scholar of southern history and one 
of the pre-eminent American historians of all time.144 Colleagues at Yale saw him as “the most 
distinguished faculty member” of a quite distinguished body.145 A quiet, aloof and often reserved 
man, Woodward was born in Arkansas in 1908 and became a historian during the Great 
Depression. He cut his teeth writing the history of the land below the Mason-Dixon line, 
focusing on race, politics and the legacy of reconstruction. These topics did not endear him to his 
fellow countrymen, who preferred to ignore their past and present injustices; Woodward would 
later claim that these early years provided him the first glimpse of the importance of freedom of 
speech.146  
In the 1950s, while Woodward taught at Johns Hopkins, his close friend Owen Lattimore 
was accused of disloyalty by the communist-hunting Senator Joseph McCarthy. Lattimore’s 
persecution left a lasting mark on the southerner, who joined other Johns Hopkins faculty in 
defending his colleague.147 In the student disrupters of the 1960s and early 1970s, C. Vann 
Woodward saw a striking parallel to the McCarthyites. Both groups “justified the means they 
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144 In an introduction to a forthcoming edited volume of Woodward’s letters, an editor ranks Woodward alongside 
such academic giants as Frederick Jackson Turner. C. Vann Woodward, The Letters of C. Vann Woodward, ed. by 
Michael O’Brien (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, forthcoming), iv. For an overview of Woodward’s life and 
his influence on Southern history, see also: John Roper, C. Vann Woodward: Southerner (Athens: University of 
Georgia Press, 1987); and, John Roper, ed., C. Vann Woodward: A Southern Historian and His Critics (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 2012). 
145 Smith, interview by author, February 15, 2013.  
146 In a speech sometime after the publication of the Woodward Report, he notes that, in the 1930s, there was 
“comparative freedom of speech—so long as one stayed off the subject of race in the South, as I did not.” C. Vann 
Woodward, “Cycles on Academic Freedom,” C. Vann Woodward Papers, Series II, Box 63, Folder 1. It is also 
likely that Woodward’s thesis adviser in graduate school, Howard Beale, influenced Woodward’s views on freedom 
of expression and civil liberties more broadly. In the interwar period when Woodward studied under him, Beale 
wrote extensively on academic freedom for pro-German secondary school teachers during and after World War I. 
During the second World War, Beale defended the rights of conscientious objectors, a topic he often wrote about to 
his former graduate student, then a professor. Howard Beale, Are American Teachers Free? An Analysis of 
Restraints Upon the Freedom of Teaching in American Schools (New York: Scribner's Sons, 1936); Howard Beale, 
A History of Freedom of Teaching in American Schools, (New York: Scribner's Sons, 1941); C. Vann Woodward 
Papers, Series I, Box 7, Folders 65-67. 
147 Roper 160-4; C Vann Woodward, Letter to the Editor of the New Statesman and Nation, November 14, 1954 in 
O’Brien, The Letters, 154-5. Note that Woodward’s letter to the New Statesman and Nation defending Owen 
Lattimore was not published by the magazine. 
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used by the ends they sought…The similarity lay in the curbing or denial of freedom of the 
opposition.”148 Not shy about his views, Woodward was known among Yale’s faculty as a man 
of “principles that were traditional, liberal, [and] democratic.”149 Yet it would be a mistake to 
view him solely as a traditionalist. A staunch advocate of civil rights, Woodward combined 
scholarship with activism, publishing books on the history of Jim Crow. When Woodward took 
the reigns of the Committee on Free Expression, he was a widely respected member of the Yale 
community with a reputation for defending tolerance in the academy. 
But Brewster not only knew Woodward’s reputation; the president knew the historian 
would firmly defend free speech at Yale. In the summer of 1974, Kingman offered Vann the 
chairmanship of the committee. Woodward expressed reluctance. He was far from impartial. The 
president remarked that Woodward’s past pronouncements in favor of free expression were of no 
concern. The subtext: the university needed someone to reaffirm its most basic values after the 
embarrassing Shockley incident. Woodward happily replied: “If you invoke the principles of free 
speech, I will rise to the occasion and accept.”150 From its inception, the purpose of the 
Woodward committee was clear: reassert the rules of Yale’s community against disruption.* 
In addition to the southerner, Brewster packed the committee with his usual trusted 
colleagues. Robert Dahl found a seat beside Woodward. Like Woodward, Dahl was not an 
impartial adjudicator on the matter of student disruption, having written in support of free speech 
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148 Woodward, “Cycles on Academic freedom.” 
149 Kagan, interview by author, January 31, 2013. 
150 C. Vann Woodward, interview by Geoffrey Kabaservice, transcript, November 6, 1991, Griswold-Brewster 
History Project, Box 12, Folder 154. Like Dahl, Woodward also possessed a standing assurance from Brewster that 
he did not need to engage in administrative responsibilities. This may have added to the historian’s initial reluctance 
to accept the chairmanship of the committee. Ibid. 
* The original text, as I wrote it in 2013, incorrectly suggested that Brewster explicitly told Woodward the 
committee should produce a result in favor of free expression. However, in the interview, the two only discussed 
whether Woodward’s known pro-free speech stance would preclude him from chairing the committee. The mistake 
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in Yale Daily News in the run-up to the Shockley affair.151 Kingman also appointed Harry 
Wellington as a committee member. A prominent law professor, Wellington would be appointed 
the dean of the Yale Law School in the midst of the committee’s proceedings. No one was more 
faithful to the president, though, than Lloyd Cutler, a prominent Washington lawyer and alumnus 
who was lecturing for a semester at his alma mater during the fall of 1974.152 By the time 
Brewster appointed Cutler to the Woodward committee, the two men had developed an intimate 
relationship: When in New Haven to teach, Cutler would sleep at the Brewsters’ official 
residence. He had advised the president on coeducation, providing legal counsel on the failed 
Vassar merger. Two years prior, in 1972, he wrote the centerpiece to a major fundraising 
campaign, a document ambitiously titled “The Case for Yale.”153 From his experiences as an 
informal aide and in his capacity as the alumni representative to the Woodward committee, 
Cutler knew that Brewster needed to please moderates among the alumni estate.  
 Cutler played a crucial role in shaping the committee’s final report to reflect positively on 
Yale’s president. C. Vann Woodward wrote the report’s second section, which traced the history 
of disruption at Yale from 1963 to 1974.154 According to Philip Sirlin, then a student member of 
the committee, Woodward presented a draft history to the group early in their proceedings. He 
concluded that, for the past decade, Yale’s administration had not protected free speech nor 
imposed discipline on unruly students. Upon reading the draft, Cutler confronted Woodward 
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151 Robert Dahl, “Shockley-Innis,” Yale Daily News, April 2, 1974, 2. 
152 Cutler had previously served as the executive director on the National Commission on Violence, a federal 
investigatory body that bridged the end of the Johnson administration and the start of Nixon’s tenure as president. In 
arguably the first study to examine the 1960s as a phenomenon, the Commission examined the causes of violence 
and social upheaval in America over the past decade. James Henry Shields, A Guide to the Microfilm Edition of 
Records of the National Commission on Violence (Lanham: University Press of America, 2004), v-viii.   
153 Lloyd Cutler, interview by Geoffrey Kabaservice, transcript, April 10, 1991, Griswold-Brewster History Project, 
Box 4, Folder 54. 
154 “Committee of the Freedom of Expression at Yale, Sub-Committees for drafting of final report,” November 24, 
1974, C. Vann Woodward Papers, Series III, Box 85, Folder 5. Dahl drafted the first section, while Cutler and 
Wellington drafted the third. 
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saying, “You can’t write this. If you write this, Kingman Brewster will have to resign.” Then, in 
Sirlin’s words, the Washington lawyer “bullied Woodward” into rewriting the history. 155 The 
nation’s most accomplished living historian caved to the pressure and agreed to massage the 
past.156  
Woodward’s final product reflected Cutler’s influence.157 His account of the Wallace 
affair ignored Mayor Lee’s statement that the governor was unwelcome in New Haven. He 
praised Brewster’s pragmatic approach for providing “stability” during periods of unrest.158 
Although the committee privately discussed the Wright Hall fiasco as a milestone in the 
university’s disciplinary policies (or lack thereof), Woodward failed to mention the incident in 
his final draft.159 The historian cast May Day as an illustrious example of freedom of speech — 
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155 Philip Sirlin, interview by author, electronic recording, February 14, 2013. 
156 The minutes of the Woodward Committee do not record the incident Sirlin described; nor does James Comer, 
another member of the Woodward Committee, remember this incident. However, I believe Sirlin’s account, despite 
the lack of corroboratory evidence. Sirlin claims that Cutler forced the committee to throw out their copies of the 
draft. It is possible the lawyer also redacted the minutes. Woodward himself may also have chosen to alter the 
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interview by author, electronic recording, March 28, 2013. 
157 Ironically, most observers faulted Woodward for producing a document that was too harsh on the president. Tom 
Cavanagh, the head of political union in 1974, published an article arguing that the union had not disinvited Wallace 
in 1963, but postponed the event. Tom Cavanagh, “George Wallace in ’63: Disinvited or Postponed?,” Yale Daily 
News, February 5, 1975, 2-3. Similarly, when conducting oral history with Woodward, Brewster biographer 
Geoffrey Kabaservice confronted Woodward for having blamed the president for events outside of his control. 
Woodward, interview by Geoffrey Kabaservice, November 6, 1991. 
158 The Report of the Committee on Freedom of Expression at Yale, 10. 
159 “Minutes of the Committee on Freedom of Expression,” October 24, 1974, C. Vann Woodward Papers, Series 
III, Box 85, Folder 5. Dahl drafted the first section, while Cutler and Wellington drafted the third. 
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despite Brewster having essentially canceled classes under the threat of violence.160 While the 
report explored Kingman’s faults, Woodward pulled his punches.161  
In the beginning of 1975, Woodward and the president submitted the first and third 
sections of the report to the university faculty for ratification.162 Brewster added two addenda to 
the report’s final recommendations: First, where the committee recommended that Yale’s 
president might discourage (but not prohibit) a contentious speaker from coming to campus, 
Kingman argued that such discouragement would be improper — despite having done just that 
when he encouraged the Political Union to disinvite Wallace in 1963. Second, where the 
Woodward committee proposed that disruptive students be subject to a disciplinary hearing, 
Brewster advocated for automatic suspension, removing disciplinary decisions from the faculty’s 
hands.163  
In part, both of these modifications to Woodward’s report reflected Brewster’s past 
experiences. Twice disappointed by faculty who refused to sanction disruptors in both the Wright 
Hall and Shockley affairs, the president was no doubt reluctant to relive those experiences in the 
future. And haunted by his actions with Wallace, he hoped to avoid further fallout from a similar !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
160 The Report of the Committee on Freedom of Expression at Yale, 14. 
161 Woodward’s charity toward the president is especially apparent when the southerner’s report is compared with a 
competing account of free speech at Yale compiled by the alumni group Lux et Veritas, Incorporated. Released 
concurrently with the Woodward report in January of 1975 but never widely circulated, LEVI’s document detailed 
both those events in the Woodward report and other incidents, such as two occasions when black students had 
disrupted public movie screenings of 1984 and Tarzan because they found the films racially offensive. “A Report on 
Free Speech and Disruption at Yale: 1963-1974,” May Day Rally and Yale Collection, Accession 1971-A-004, Box 
4. Happily for Woodward’s portrayal of history, LEVI’s more critical version of events was never widely circulated. 
The document was prematurely released by the undergraduate chapter of the alumni organization, unbeknownst to 
and against the wishes of the alumni members of the group. The incident led to LEVI’s dissolution. The older, 
somewhat loyal (and clearly conflicted) alumni saw their younger members’ act as overly pugnacious at a time when 
Yale was in the midst of a capital campaign. Ashamed at their undergraduate chapter’s behavior, LEVI’s board 
consequently voted to disband and donate its remaining assets to Yale. William Stack, Letter to Kingman Brewster, 
January 31, 1975, Vice-President for Development and Alumni Affairs, Accession 1979-A-053, Box 1, Folder 1. 
162 Woodward did not offer the second section to his colleagues, claiming that would create an “official history.” It 
is also possible that Woodward was embarrassed for having produced a less-than-fully-honest history due to Cutler’s 
pressure. Woodward, interview by Geoffrey Kabaservice, November 6, 1991. 
163 Kingman Brewster, Letter to the Yale College Faculty, January 8, 1975, Kingman Brewster, Jr., President of Yale 
University, Records (RU 11). Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library, Box 435, Folder 7. 
Zelinsky 46!
situation. However, it is equally possible that Yale’s president offered these two measures to 
appear “tough” on student misbehavior. By seeming even stricter than the stern Woodward, 
Brewster repositioned himself as a model of a robust disciplinarian, firmly committed to resisting 
lawlessness on campus.  
The Woodward report was not revolutionary in its substance. The committee advocated 
suspension or expulsion for student disrupters, the penalties already prescribed by the 
university’s existing regulations.164 But, despite its lack of originality, the report seemed 
groundbreaking. According to Woodward’s recollections, it “was certainly regarded as new.” 
More importantly, though, “it was a forceful description of what was going to be policy, what the 
purpose of the policy was, and what the purpose of the university was.”165 The report offered an 
eloquent and appealing reaffirmation of how students should act that attracted schools around the 
country. In a preface, Woodward framed his document in a national context: the university’s 
problems “are shared by sister institutions at home and abroad;” he hoped that his report might 
“inspire” other schools to similarly reaffirm their principles as citadels of free expression.166  
Over the next few months, national press covered the report with enthusiasm, often 
quoting the line that civil societies must be able to “think the unthinkable, discuss the 
unmentionable, and challenge the unchallengeable.” The New York Times published two articles 
describing the Woodward committee in detail and printed a long excerpt from the philosophical 
first section.167 When Richard Nixon’s former press secretary Ronald Ziegler was disinvited 
from Boston University that February, the paper quoted C. Vann Woodward in its editorials 
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164 This observation was not lost on some professors during the faculty’s meeting. Minutes of the General Faculty of 
Yale College, 16 January 1975, Ibid. 
165 Woodward, interview by Geoffrey Kabaservice, November 6, 1991. 
166 The Report of the Committee on Freedom of Expression at Yale, 2-3. 
167 Anthony Lewis, “A Report on The Dangers To the Right Of Free Speech,” New York Times, January 26, 1975, 
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supporting Ziegler’s right to speak.168 The Chicago Tribune, the Los Angles Times, and others 
heralded the report as a must-read for all academics.169 Even the committee’s detractors admitted 
that its product was “lofty.”170 Through Woodward, Brewster presented Yale to the public as a 
seeming bastion of civility and free speech.171  
******* 
Historians have a difficult time categorizing the 1970s, often compressing it into either 
the end of the prior decade or the start of the succeeding one. Many speak of the long Sixties, 
with a capital “S,” a “decade” that culminates in 1974 with the Watergate scandal and Richard 
Nixon’s resignation. In this narrative, the Sixties were a period of radicalism in politics and 
culture, on both the left and the right of the ideological spectrum.172 Lately, scholars have 
investigated the transnational aspect of that social upheaval, placing America’s trials in a global 
framework.173 And there is an equally clear understanding, though less thoroughly researched, of 
the 1980s — a time of conservative revival, Ronald Reagan, and the end of the Cold War.174 
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168 “The New Censors,” The New York Times, February 2, 1975, E14.   
169 “Free speech at Yale,” Chicago Tribune, March 22, 1975, N12; “A Lesson for Academe,” Los Angeles Times, 
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173 For the groundbreaking work on transnationalism and the 1960s, see: Jeremy Suri, Power and Protest: Global 
Revolution and the Rise of Detente (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003). 
174 I believe that Laura Kalman’s Right Star Rising falls into this camp. While it does treat the 1970s as a 
phenomenon, it peddles the thesis of the “short Seventies” (from 1974-1980), a time period wholly unique for it’s 
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From this vantage point, the last years of the 1970s were nothing more than the doldrums of 
popular discontent from which the Reagan Revolution sprang.  
Recently, scholars have begun to reevaluate the 1970s as a decade in and of its own right, 
more than merely the death throes of the long Sixties or the birth pangs of 1980s. In a typical 
overview of the decade, an aptly titled Something Happened, Edward Berkowitz argues that 
indeed something distinct did happen in the 1970s: the post-war consensus finally collapsed as 
increasingly divisive debates, such as those over women’s rights and gay rights, embroiled the 
nation.175 To him and other historians, the decade embodied a rejection of existing norms and 
authorities and a search for a replacement of the status quo.176 Daniel Rodgers builds on this 
conclusion in Age of Fracture. For Rodgers, the 1970s was a moment in which “Americans tried 
to reimagine themselves and their society” through intellectual and ideological wars across a 
“half-dozen fronts.”177 The result was a society that emphasized individuals over institutions, the 
personal over the communal.  
An understudied discipline, the study of higher education lags behind its peer sub-fields 
within history in analyzing the 1970s.178 For the few historians who do tackle the decade in the 
context of universities, most interpretations focus on the effects of a macro-economy troubled by 
oil shocks on institutions of learning. Shrinking endowments, declining enrollments, and fiscal 
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1990). 
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shortfalls preoccupied administrators’ time.179 This analysis conforms to what participants 
themselves remembered. Kingman Brewster remarked that as the 1970s began, his focus shifted 
“from law and order to balancing the budget.”180 Others had difficulty categorizing the decade at 
Yale. For Jonathan Fanton, after the early 1970s, Brewster and Yale lacked a “clear…agenda.”181 
But in hindsight, a different picture emerges of Yale and America’s campuses more 
broadly in the 1970s. The Dahl and Woodward committees reveal a period of redefinition and 
reaffirmation in higher education — a conclusion at odds with the one Rodgers describes in Age 
of Fracture. The unruly 1960s led Brewster to adopt pragmatism to govern effectively. A 
cautious approach toward coeducation mollified cantankerous alumni whose support he needed. 
And often ceding to the threat of violence and disruption — or at least seeming to cave to these 
pressures — Brewster preserved the university from erupting into a conflagration of unrest. Yale 
survived the 1960s virtually unscathed because of his pragmatism. 
At the onset of the 1970s the twin stresses of unruly alumni and student estates subsided. 
Absent the challenges of radicalism, Brewster’s pragmatism seemed both weak and extreme: His 
vow for “one thousand male leaders a year” committed him to preserving a male dominated 
Yale. And, in failing to quell disruptive students, he appeared unable to maintain order on 
campus. With the two committees, Brewster found a way to redefine himself and his university. 
In the Study Group on Yale College, he shed his promises to the alumni and expanded the 
definition of who could become part of the Yale community. With the Committee on Freedom of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
179 One notable exception to this trend is Loss’ Between Citizen and The State. In his concluding chapter, he 
convincingly (but briefly) shows how the national debates over feminism spilled onto college campuses in the 
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180 Kingman Brewster, interview by Kirby Simon, no date, Griswold-Brewster History Project, Box 2, Folder 16. 
181 Fanton, interview by Geoffrey Kabaservice, July 18, 1992. Fanton’s portrayal of Brewster’s administration as 
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Expression, he successfully recast his reputation as a soft disciplinarian and established firm 
standards for how students should behave.  
In these two cases, Yale’s president sought to codify who should be a part of the Yale 
community and how those community members should act. For some, like Elga Wasserman, 
there was a clear relationship between the first codification of Yale’s admissions and the second 
codification of its norms. The need to articulate rules was an unintended consequence of the 
demographically changing student body: The new women on campus did not “buy into all of the 
established norms” because they felt rejected by the existing “Yale tradition.”182 Brewster thus 
first invited new types of undergraduates onto the university playground and then told them the 
rules of the game. Far from being an age of a fracturing society as Rodgers might have us think, 
the 1970s at Yale were more aptly titled the age of codification, when Brewster reformulated the 
boundaries of the university community.183 
The Dahl Committee and the Woodward Committee were born in a moment of self-
reflection at Yale. Yet far from parochial, they were part of larger national conversations about 
the role of the university in society — an academic conversation in turn based in a nation’s 
search for itself. The Study Group echoed the Carnegie Commission and others who sought to 
redefine the landscape of higher education for a modern era. The Committee on Freedom of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
182 Elga Wasserman, interview by Geoffrey Kabaservice, May 7, 1992. Remember that coeducation also coincided 
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Expression was a national conversation in its own right, analyzed and cited by popular 
commentators as a watershed moment in academia. 
The results of Brewster’s committees have proved durable: Today’s Yale undergraduates 
are evenly split between men and women.184 Woodward’s report remains the university’s official 
policy on freedom of expression.185 With the final score tallied, Yale’s president successfully 
rehabilitated his reputation and created new rules for the university. But the question remains: 
What did Brewster truly believe? Were the policies of gender inclusivity and free expression that 
Brewster championed with the Woodward and Dahl committees his true beliefs? Or were these 
committees simply pragmatic ways to extricate himself from two politically untenable stances? 
One of Brewster’s colleagues once remarked that the president “could live gracefully with 
ambiguity. He understood ambiguity. He understood the complexity of things.”186 Today, it 
remains ambiguous what exact combination of realism and idealism motivated Brewster. In 
many ways, this conclusion echoes F. Scott Fitzgerald’s dictum that “the sign of a first rate 
intellect is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time and still function.” 
Brewster was that type of intellect.187 
In part, though, Brewster only articulated his vision for Yale — in the precise way that he 
did and at the time that he did — because he was forced to. Without the twin stimuli of alumni 
unrest and student disruption, along with the resulting backlash of staid faculty and Yale !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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graduates, Kingman Brewster may never have so coherently reformulated the university. From 
this vantage point, the crucible of the 1960s had an unintended consequence in the 1970s. Unrest 
caused leaders in the field of higher education, such as Brewster, to define the boundaries and 
norms of their academic monarchies. In challenging the university administration, students and 
alumni seem to have ironically bolstered it. 
The particular crises that Brewster confronted are unlikely to reoccur. Even at the height 
of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, college campuses were mostly calm and peaceful — a far 
cry from the 9,400 separate protests at universities in the 1969-1970 academic year. It is 
similarly improbable that unhappy alumni will form well-funded groups, like Lux et Veritas, Inc, 
to protest policies at their almae matres. But future challenges in higher education will certainly 
arise, and modern administrators can look to Brewster’s example — an example of how to 
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Writing the essay I had in mind necessitated delving into three different subjects: The 
histories of Yale, university governance generally, and the 1970s broadly. Each of those sub-
fields presented unique challenges: At the moment, scholarship on the 1970s is in transition, with 
a burgeoning body of new work appearing. Few historians have written about the history of 
higher education, and even fewer have focused on this time period. And almost no one has 
examined Yale University in the 1970s.  
Because Yale is at the heart of the story I wanted to tell, I first tackled the existing 
literature on the university and its president. Geoffrey Kabaservice’s The Guardians is the only 
study that covers Kingman Brewster’s administration — and even he tells Brewster’s story 
alongside those of fellow liberal elites, including such greats as McGeorge Bundy, John Lindsay, 
and Cyrus Vance. In his portrayal of how these wealthy Yale graduates governed the country, 
Kabaservice led me to see Brewster as a pragmatist, someone willing to simultaneously 
champion old and new ideas in order to survive the 1960s. But I also found Kabaservice’s thesis 
wrapped up in a declensionist narrative that idealizes the liberal elite and their moment in power. 
He mourns the tragic fall of the eastern Republicans with the election of Richard Nixon. This 
narrative forces him to mold Brewster’s life into a downfall shortly after 1968 — because just as 
McGeorge Bundy left the White House, Brewster needed to face similar failures to fit into 
Kabaservice’s narrative arc. The Guardians thus ends with the events of May Day 1970 and 
concludes that, after 1971, Brewster was an ineffective president.  
To fill in the ensuing seven years of Brewster’s presidency that Kabaservice largely 
ignores, I turned to three types of primary sources: living participants, past oral history, and 
various university records in the Sterling Library.  
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I was lucky to have repeated access to Henry “Sam” Chauncey, Jr., who provided me 
with an invaluable perspective on Yale in the Brewster years. From his time as the president’s 
special assistant and later the university’s secretary, Chauncey was at the center of this story. 
Numerous conversations with Chauncey helped me narrow my topic to the Dahl and Woodward 
committees specifically, identifying the intricate problems that Kingman faced in the 1960s and 
1970s. (I had previously written a short paper on the Dahl committee in Jay Gitlin’s Yale an 
America seminar, in which Chauncey’s recollections proved useful.) Later in my research 
process, I benefited from speaking with professors Donald Kagan and Gaddis Smith, both of 
whom were involved in issues of free speech, Kagan as a conservative provocateur in the faculty 
and Smith as an administrator. I also was fortunate to speak with three surviving members of the 
two committees. Of those, Philip Sirlin offered the most unexpected bombshell: that C. Vann 
Woodward had redacted his history of free expression at Yale at the behest of Lloyd Cutler. 
While I could not verify Sirlin’s account with independent evidence, I am fairly confident in his 
sincerity.  
The transcripts of interviews conducted in the Griswold-Brewster Oral History Project 
supplied access to those I could not meet today. Geoffrey Kabaservice conducted these 
interviews in 1991 and 1992, and the project provided the material for much of his book. 
Because of my interest in the 1970s, I was not simply retreading ground covered in The 
Guardians, but was instead focusing on previously unpublished material. A phone conversation 
with Kabaservice helped indentify some transcripts of unexpected importance that I would not 
have otherwise seen. In two cases, with Chauncey and Kagan, the transcripts allowed me to 
refine the focus of my own interviews with each man. In the unfortunate case of Robert Dahl, the 
interview included nothing about the Dahl Committee — Kabaservice had intended to conduct a 
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follow-up interview, but never did. Typically, most of the Griswold-Brewster Oral History 
Project stayed at the surface level; the various participants in Brewster’s Yale painted the 
university and its culture in broad strokes.   
Eight separate collections of university records provided the specificity that the oral 
history lacked. The voluminous minutes of the Dahl Committee provided a moment-by-moment 
account of each meeting. The Woodward Committee’s records proved similarly detailed, if 
slightly less lengthy. For my purposes, the internal deliberations of the committees were only 
important when they intersected Brewster’s campus politics, and I tended not to cite them in my 
final product. Instead, I relied on other collections, including the papers of Wasserman’s office 
and the extensive records of the office of the president. In one case, the internal records 
pertaining to Lux et Veritas, Inc., I successfully petitioned the university to unseal the 
documents, which were otherwise restricted. In the process of my research, I stumbled across a 
number of anecdotes that corrected the existing historical record — for instance, that Brewster’s 
speech at May Day contained a passionate exhortation for the university to remain open in 
addition to his comments about the Seale trial.  
Despite my wealth of sources, what I most lacked at the end of the day was Kingman 
Brewster in his own words, be they personal letters or diaries. An introverted and somewhat shy 
man, Brewster fittingly left behind few windows into his innermost private thoughts. Parts of this 
paper, particularly the section on the Dahl Committee, rely on inference to deduce his intentions.  
 Happily, I could peer into another closed mind, that of C. Vann Woodward. John 
Roper’s biography of the southern historian provided the basic outlines of Woodward’s life and 
scholarship, though Roper offered surprisingly little information about Woodward’s commitment 
to free expression. Woodward’s personal papers at Yale led me to examine his relationship with 
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civil-libertarian Howard Beale, his unpublished writings on free speech, and his friendship with 
Donald Kagan. Later in the process, I was also fortunate enough to receive an advanced copy of 
Michael O’Brien’s forthcoming edited collection of Woodward’s letters, which led me to 
correspondence that I would not have otherwise seen. While much of this material did not find 
its way directly into my paper, I hope that my analysis of Woodward’s principles and how he 
may have airbrushed history to protect Brewster adds to the growing attention that surrounds one 
of America’s greatest historians.  
 The next challenge to my paper was the lack of historians studying higher education. 
Because most universities possess dedicated education departments, studies of American 
universities are typically written by social scientists interested in the present landscape of higher 
education or non-academic polemicists who lack the pretense of objectivity. Additionally, the 
history of higher education is best written through the lens of a single institution. However, in the 
current academic climate, scholars view institutional histories as hobbies, not serious 
accomplishments. In the 1950s, Yale professor George Pierson wrote a definitive two-volume 
history of the university and numerous similar books, feats that earned him distinction within his 
scholarly community. Today, Pierson’s professional path is inconceivable. As a result, cultural 
and political historians generally avoid higher education — both because they lack a home in 
most schools’ departments and their scholarship may not lead to career advancement.  
There are three broad exceptions to this trend: First, some historians have traced how the 
Cold War led to an alliance between the American government, which needed to maintain a 
technological edge over the Soviets, and research universities happy to accept government 
monies. Second, some aspects of higher education can be found in other sub-fields, such as the 
general scholarship surrounding social unrest of the 1960s. Martha Biondi’s The Black 
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Revolution on Campus is a good such example. Third, a few scholars have defied the trend and 
have written accomplished overviews of higher education. While slightly out of date, The 
American College and University by Frederick Rudolph traces the evolution of post-secondary 
education from colonial times to the 1960s. Rudolph led me to consider the growing role of 
alumni in university governance after the Civil War, the birth of the modern academic 
bureaucracy at the turn of the century, and the relationship between the larger American culture 
and its universities. I also hugely benefited from Jerome Karabel’s tour-de-force study of 
admissions policies at Harvard, Yale and Princeton. While I disagree with Karabel’s portrayal of 
the Dahl Committee as at-odds with Brewster’s wishes, The Chosen provided a well-researched 
back-story of coeducation at Yale situated within the context of American culture. More 
recently, Christopher Loss’ Between Citizens and the State traces the relationship between 
institutions of higher learning and government in the twentieth century. In examining the role of 
universities as political battlegrounds, he shows how campuses in the 1970s were at the center of 
the culture-wars.  
In many ways, Loss suffers from a symptom of scholarship on the 1970s more broadly: 
He elides that decade with the 1960s, choosing to view American culture through the lens of the 
“long Sixties.” Extending the incredibly tumultuous 1960s into the 1970s leads him to 
overestimate the extent of strife on campuses in the second period. This led to my final 
challenge: how to view the 1970s? In eschewing the concept of the long Sixties, I am not 
attempting to re-write the mountain of scholarship that employs this frame of analysis. Instead, I 
wanted to illustrate how a different perspective on the decade leads to a different understanding 
of the 1970s and universities at the time. As Loss, Karabel, Rudolph and others have admirably 
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demonstrated, college campuses provide a window into American culture. If we use that window 
but abandon the long Sixties, what do we see about America?  
In asking this question, I was aided by Daniel Rodgers’ Age of Fracture. Unlike Edward 
Berkowitz’s Something Happened, Rodgers focuses heavily on ideas, not events. In doing so, he 
studies America’s search for identity through the intersection of the cultural and the political — a 
similar intersection of people and their thoughts that make university campuses a dynamic slice 
of society to analyze. What I found at Yale complicates Rodgers’ conclusion of fractured 
individualism, though admittedly Rodgers’ frame of reference often extends into the 1980s and 
1990s. Through Dahl and Woodward, Brewster codified norms and boundaries for his 
community that the campus and the broader country respected. Does this overturn Rodgers 
thesis? No. But it adds a dimension to the 1970s as a time of consensus building on college 
campuses that both he and Loss miss for different reasons. 
I am grateful to a number of people for their help this past year. Thank you to my adviser, 
Professor Jay Gitlin, for allowing me to kibitz in his office far too much. To Sam Chauncey, for 
providing a backboard off of which to bounce many thoughts. To Professor Michael O’Brien, 
who graciously offered me a copy of his book, despite the fact that I could not yet articulate my 
thesis. I also owe a debt to the people who lent me their time and allowed me to interview them. 
Finally, thank you to those who read my drafts, especially the staunch few who looked for typos. 
